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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*

HIGHWAY NICKELODEON
The common law rule handed down by Lord Ellenborough a century and a quarter
ago, "No one can make a stableyard out of the King's highway," [Rex v. Cross, 3
Camp. 224, 227, 170 Eng. Reprints 1362, 1363 (K. B. 1812)],
in its modem version, "No one can make a private garage
Drop Your
out of the public street," [Pugh v. Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593,
Coin
156 N. W. 892 (1916)] has been affected vith a condition
smacking of commercialism in most states. The seemingly illegal use of the streets
as a public garage is never objected to provided that "rental" is promptly paid to
the municipality in the form of a fine. Of late, methods of collection have been
streamlined by the more progressive communities. We have what are known as
"parking meters". Progressives are installing the "mechanical cops" in order to give
the harassed motorist an opportunity to park conveniently. Now great numbers of
autoists park by inserting a coin, generally a nickel, in the robot which sets a time
device in operation. The commercial spirit seems to be the same.
Hardly had the first coin dropped into a parking meter before a chorus of criticism
resounded throughout the land, starting with an overture anent due process of
law, running the scale of deprivation of property right, and
ending in a frenzied blare over the wrongful exercise of
The Music
police and taxing powers. A new note was sounded when
Starts
the validity of a "parking meter" ordinance was tested for
the first time in New York, in the case of Gilsey Buildings Inc. v. Village of Great
Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 694 (Sup. Ct. 1939) positing the theory
that the ordinance interfered with the plaintiff's easement of access to the highway,
as an abutting owner, contrary to the N. Y. CONST., Art. 1, § 6. But it fell on deaf
ears in the dispute.
The scant attention which the courts have paid to complaints of abutting owners
in other situations might have warned the plaintiff of the futility of his argument
here. The courts have played a symphony of approval from
their side of the stage. Interferences with the abutter's
The Anvil
rights, which are unlawful when committed by private parties,
Chorus
are generally held to be lawful if a regulation under the
police power. The Elevated Railway Cases apparently stood for the proposition that
an abutter's rights of access, light and air are property rights which cannot be taken
by the state without compensation. Story v. N. Y. Elev. R. R., 90 N. Y. 122 (1882);
Lohr v. MetropolitanElev. Ry., 104 N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528 (1887). This stand has
been considerably modified by more recent decisions. In Sauer v. New York, 180
N. Y. 27, 72 N. E. 579 (1904), aff'd, 206 U. S. 536 (1907), the city built a viaduct
which interfered with the plaintiff's rights of light, air and access, as much so as the
elevated railroads, yet the court held these rights to be subject to all reasonable
*BrmREL, OnrrmR DicrA (1885) title page.
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exercise of the police power. In Thompson v. Boston, 212 Alass. 211, 98 N. E. 700
(1912), the right of the city to erect a railing around an excavation was upheld,
though it interfered with the plaintiff's right of access. In State v. Burttet 119 Aid.
609, 87 Atl. 514 (1913), the power of the city to permit public marketing stalls to
be erected at the street curb in front of a department store was sustained even
though they thereby prevented employees from using that part of the street for
loading and unloading merchandise. The Elevated Cases, however, cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be held analogous to these "parking meter" cases.
The equally discouraging history of the failure of all of the ordinary arguments
might have served as notice to the plaintiff. Similar meter ordinances have been
upheld in State ex reL. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936) and
in Harper v. Wichita Falls, 105 S. W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) where they
were said to be a lawful exercise of the police power to obtain revenue; and in
Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P. (2d) 1015 (1937) where they were held not
to be an unreasonable interference with the right of the public to use the streets.
In each case the court discussed the respective right of the public and the property
owners in the street.
Apparently, only one rasping note in the whole symphony of judicial approval of
parking meters is heard. In Breinig v. Allegheny County, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A. (2d) 842

(1938), the court held that an abutting owner's right of
access to the highway is a property right which cannot be
taken without just compensation, and, that as parking may
amount to a private nuisance, he may prevent the parking
of automobiles in front of his premises despite police regulations to the contrary.
New York considers this right, standing alone, as damnum absque injuria. Matter
of Grade Crossing Commissioners, 201 N. Y. 32, 37, 94 N. E. 18, 191 (1911). It
is true that in City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 172 So. 114
(Ala. 1936), a parking meter ordinance was held invalid on the grounds that it would
deprive the abutting owner of his property without due process of law, in that it
unduly interfered with his right of access, and also as an unauthorized exercise of the
taxing power. The case, however, is predicated upon a violation, by the ordinance,
of a deed of dedication of the streets to the city. The case is criticized and distin.
guished in Harper v. Wichita Falls and in the Gilsey case.
Having exhausted every imaginable type of attack, the public, when confronted
with the meter, will simply have to grin and bear it. Its acquaintance with traffic
signals, which in the long run cost considerably more in
gasoline consumption than the new parking charges, should
It's An
have immunized the public to the unpredictable effects of
Old Tune
an expanding police power. But human nature being what
it is, while unanimously agreeing that it is worth a nickel to park. seems equally
adamant in the contention that there ought to be a law against laws like the "parking
meter" ordinances.
A Discordant
Note

UNMaIASURED

WORDS

How shall the language of the law be interpreted when given a word of ambiguous
meaning? The solution would seem to be to fall back upon common usage. Tennessee
v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139, 147 (1886). We all know that
within a comparatively short time, many former meanings
What's In
of a word may be lost and it will be applied as befits the
A Word
popular whim. When usage is uncertain, what then? The
proposed "Child Labor Amendment" has given rise to such a problem of word analysis.
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It is still unsettled. Section 1 reads: "The Congress shall have the power to limit,
regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under 18 years of age." What does the
term labor in this sentence mean? Proponents of the amendment aver that it refers
only to physical labor of children, employed for hire. Opponents, however, contend
that it may cover labor, whether physical or mental (and thereby permit Congress to
regulate education!). What meanings are latent in the word, "labor"?
It seems to be generally conceded that the word "labor" as used in the proposed
amendment is descriptive of "labor" done either gratuitously or for wages. [For a
thorough analysis of this point as well as the entire problem and its relation to education, see (1938) 7 FoRD rAm L. REv. 217]. But we are primarily interested in the
second question, "Does labor cover mental effort?" on which unanimity is sadly
lacking.
At common law a "laborer" was taken to be one who did menial or manual services. 1 BL. Comm. *427. For a time, at least, this definition was associated with the
word "labor". But the usage of years has worn down the
A Word to
ancient dikes set about it and its diverse meanings now are
the Wise
like a vast flood covering much territory. Thus an architect
may labor on plans and specifications for a building. See
Paddock v. Balgord, 2 S. D. 100, 103, 48 N. W. 840, 841 (1891). Some states have
gone to the point of holding that "labor" includes anything that taxes one's strength.
A professional ball-player whether he "uses his head" or "pulls a boner" may aptly
be said to be laboring; the mental aspect often being more injurious to his physical
nature than the manual labor. See Crooks v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 593, 598, 136
S. E. 565, 567 (1927). In Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 183, 48 N. E. 108, 110
(1897), it was said that "labor" was interpretable as "intellectual exertion" or "mental effort". Both "work" and "labor", it seems, are used to describe work whether it
be with one's head or with one's hands. Johnson v. Citizens' Trust Co., 78 Ind. App.
487, 489, 136 N. E. 49, 50 (1922). And so a telephone operator whose task involves
"intellectual exertion rather than physical labor" may be said to be "laboring",
whether she be "plugging" in fact or giving one the wrong number. Commonwealth
v. Connor Co., 222 Mass. 296, 110 N. E. 301 (1915).
And thus in a recent decision, Monahan v. Seeds and Durham, 117 Pa. Super.
469, 3 A. (2d) 998 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 6 A. (2d) 889 (1939), it was held
that the benefit of Workmen's Compensation Laws were availAn Expanding
able for accidental injuries traceable in major part to overexertion due to mental efforts. This is but another enlargeWord
ment of the already expansive connotation embraced by the
meaning of the word "labor." Within ohr own jurisdiction a further notch in the belt
was added. An act to amend the Penal Law in relation to "kick back" of wages was
passed. (See RECENT STATUTES, supra, p. 144.) Prior to the amendment, the statute
referred to persons engaged "in personal services." It was changed in 1939 to those
performing "labor" instead. Is there any doubt that the word "labor" within the present statute, which was formerly restricted to contracts for personal services only, now
includes work of a mental nature as well? Whether it be with pen or pick: brawn or
brain: one or all, man labors.
And if "labor" may be done gratuitously or for hire, does not the meaning of the
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word "labor" as situated in the so-called "Child Labor Amendment" encompass
mental work of a gratudtous nature? Is not the right "to
limit, regulate, and prohibit" the gratuitous mental work of
The Last
Word
minors in effect a broad delegation of authority to Congress
which might ultimately lead to Federal control of education
without twist or distortion of interpretation? The answers would seem to lie in the
changes suggested by opponents: abolish the proposed amendment completely or
qualify its objectionable wording to meet the need said to exist in certain situations.
In its present form, one wonders if the horse will unseat the rider.

